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Introduction 
The tax treatment of expenditures on research and development (R&D) has 
been modified several times in recent years as the government has sought to 
establish a viable system of incentives for investment in R&D. These incentives 
have been designed to raise the level of R&D in order to improve the 
international competitiveness and productivity of the Canadian economy. 
The Canadian environment for R&D has undergone some significant 
changes in the last five years. Both the 1983 and 1985 budgets introduced several 
changes to the tax system to provide incentives for increased R&D. Basic 
elements of these changes involved generous write-offs, generous investment 
tax credit, introduction of the Scientific Research Tax Credit (SRTC), 
refundable tax credit etc. As will be shown later in this paper, not all these 
initiatives were successful; some were shunned by the investors due to 
complexity and costs, whereas the SRTC program resulted in a substantial cost 
to the federal government. 
The purpose of this paper is to discuss recent Canadian experience with tax 
incentives for R&D. The intent is to outline some issues in efficiency and cost 
effectiveness of these various government incentives in promoting domestic 
R&D. The paper is organized as follows: 
In the second section, data is presented on the overall degree of financial 
support provided for R&D by tax incentives. The experience with limited 
partnerships as a vehicle for financing R&D is reviewed in the third section. The 
problems and issues associated with the Scientific Research Tax Credit that 
led to its termination are considered in section four. In section five the current 
tax treatment of R&D after the May 1985 budget is contrasted with that in 
effect before the April 1983 budget and some conclusions are drawn on the 
relative levels of support for various categories of corporations and regions. The 
difficult question of the adequacy of tax incentives for R&D is addressed in 
section six. This includes an examination of the evolution of two indicators of 
the degree of support for R&D provided by the tax system. These indices are 
the after-tax cost of R&D and the "B-index" proposed by Donald McFetridge 
and Jacek Warda. 1 The historical record for industrial R&D spending is also 
examined to see if there is any obvious relationship between R&D spending and 
changes in tax expenditures. Section seven presents overall conclusions on the 
current structure of tax incentives for R&D. 
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The Data on Tax Incentives for R&D 
Data on the investment tax credit for the 1978 to 1982 period for which they are 
available are provided in Table I. These statistics cover only the companies 
included in the survey of industrial research and development. These companies 
accounted for 95 per cent of the credits claimed in 1982. In 1982 the investment 
tax credit for R&D was $127 million, accounting for 9 per cent of intramural 
R&D spending of claimants. The increase in the number of claimants and in 
credit claims in 1979 following the enrichment of the tax credit in 1978 is 
notable. A similar increase can be expected following the 1983 increases in the 
credit. 
Table 1 
Number of Claimants, Investment Tax Credit Claimed 
and Intramural Expenditures Incurred for R&D 
	
1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 	 198: 
Number of -Claimants 	 75 	 143 290 290* 	 727 84 
Credit Claimed ($ millions) 	 11 	 28 	 58 	 78 	 122 	 127  
Intramural Expenditures 	 340 	 586 	 772 999 	 1,451 1,48. 
Claims/ Expenditures (%) 	 3 	 5 	 8 	 8 	 8 	 9 
(*) The total number of claimants did not decrease in 1980: fewer smaller claimants were directl, 
surveyed for 1980 than for 1979. 
Source: Statistics Canada, Industrial Research and Development Statistics 1983, catalone 
88-202, p. 45. 
An additional allowance for scientific research came into force on January 1. 
1978. Until it was replaced by an increase in the investment tax credit in 1983, it 
allowed companies to deduct from their taxable income an additional amount 
equal to 50 per cent of the difference between R&D expenditures in the current 
year and the average of the three preceeding years. 
Table 2 shows the number of claimants for the additional R&D allowance 
and the amount claimed. The 705 claimants in 1982 represented only 41 per cent 
of R&D performers surveyed, but accounted for 78 per cent of intramural 
R&D expenditures. 
Table 2 
Number of Claimants and Their Claims for the 
Additional Allowance for Scientific Research 
	
1978 	 1979 	 1980 	 1981 	 19f 
Number of Claimants 	 103 	 266 	 316 	 620 	 7( 5 
Allowance Claimed ($ millions) 	 50 	 128 	 182 	 279 	 2; 
Source: Statistics Canada, Industrial Research and Development Statistics 1983, catalogue 
88-202, p. 51. 
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Note that the amount claimed is not the same as the tax savings to the firm 
from the allowance. To derive an estimate of the tax savings the amount 
claimed must be multiplied by the effective marginal tax rate of the firms 
claiming the allowance. 
Estimates of the total value of all tax incentives for R&D were provided in 
the Department of Finance paper, Research and Development Tax Policies, 
which was released with the April 1983 budget. These are reproduced in Table 
3. This same paper estimated that the changes to R&D tax policies which have 
now been implemented would add some $100 million to the approximately 
$225 million of R&D tax support currently available and that other budget 
changes would add another $85 million. This was estimated to bring the total 
annual tax incentives for R&D up to $410 million. Due to much greater than 
anticipated take-up of the Scientific Research Tax Credit, the current unofficial 
estimates for the total tax expenditures for R&D are much higher than those 
published in the budget paper. The cost of the SRTC alone is estimated to be 
$1.9 billion or $650 million per year of R&D funded. Hence, from 1983 to 1985 
the annual cost of tax incentives for R&D can be estimated to average about $1 
billion. 
Table 3 
Federal Tax Expenditures for R&D 
Year 
1975 
1976 
Immediate 
Write-Off 
15 
15 
Investment 
Tax Credit 
Special 50% 
Allowance Total 
15 
15 
1977 25 5 — 30 
1978 35 20 15 70 
1979 40 50 45 135 
1980 55 60 45 160 
1981 70 75 50 195 
1982 60 80 50 190 
Source: Department of Finance, Research and Development Tax Policies, April 1983, p. 7. 
Limited Partnerships 
The Canadian experience with R&D limited partnerships comprises an 
interesting, but unsuccessful, example of how the tax system can be used to 
promote R&D. 2 Very little money has ever actually been raised for R&D 
through this vehicle. Nevertheless, much attention was focussed on the limited 
partnership offerings which were made to fund the development of computer 
software. 
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There were two basic variations of the limited partnership approach. The 
general partner could conduct the R&D itself or act as a principal and contract 
with an agent (the research corporation) to carry out the R&D. In either case, 
the general partner provided management, marketing, and financial services to 
the limited partners and contract management where the R&D activity was 
farmed out. 
Usually, the general partner was a wholly owned subsidiary of the performer 
and contracted the R&D activity to the performer. 
Results of the research were shared by the partners and research corporation 
on a percentage of revenue basis in order to avoid royalty treatment. Royalties 
were deemed to be investment income from property. To qualify for the R&D 
tax treatment, the earnings had to be from business, not property. 
The overall attractiveness of the tax provisions were twofold from the point 
of view of a qualifying investor considering the purchase of a limited 
partnership. First, the deductions and credits were deductible from other 
income or income tax payable of limited partnership investors — a provision 
similar to that relating to the capital consumption allowance and soft costs of 
the MU RB program. Second, the total expenditure was deductible in the year 
incurred at the option of the taxpayer and partnership. 
The 100 per cent deduction from income for current and capital expenditures 
on R&D was available to all partners — be they corporations or individual& 
The deduction was reduced by the investment tax credit (dealt with later) and 
government grants. The deductions could be claimed in the year incurred or be 
carried forward indefinitely. Usually, the partnership covenanted to claim the 
maximum amount in the year incurred. For corporations (not individuals) who 
were not partners, i.e., the R&D performer and co-venturers, a 50 per cent 
research allowance applied. The investment tax credit was also available to 
limited partners. 
Table 4 shows the tax relief for a $1,000 investment in an R&D limited 
partnership assuming that the investor has a marginal tax rate of 50 per cent_ 
Unless an investor was deemed to be a trader of R&D partnership interests ot-
had acquired the interest as an adventure in the nature of the trade, he/she was 
accorded capital gains (losses) treatment upon disposition of an interest. 
An offering to the public of the R&D limited partnership was subject to the 
requirements of provincial securities laws. Besides the required financial and 
organizational information, the prospectuses emphasized the high risk ar 
absence of an organized market for the partnership interests. 
The attractiveness of the tax savings to high marginal rate payers 
stressed. This along with a minimum subscription amount of $5,000 increase,: 
the probability that investors would be individuals with high incomes. 
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Table 4 
After-Tax Cost of Investing in an R&D Limited Partnership 
R&D Investment 	 $1,000 
Less: 
Investment Tax Credit 	 (100) 
Amount Deductible 	 900 
Tax Savings at 50% 	 450 
Add: 
Investment Tax Credit 	 100 
Add: 
Incremental Tax Saving 
Total Tax Saving 	 550 
. After Tax Cost 	 450 
During 1981 and 1982, there were only six limited partnership offerings to the 
public. Five involved "research, development and marketing of computer 
software"; the remaining one involved research in biotechnological products 
and processes. 
Selling investors on the profit potential of a portfolio of projects was the key 
to marketing the high risk investments. The number of projects involved in a 
typical software tax shelter provided some diversification, but given the overall 
risk of each, a general feeling was that these types of investments were very 
risky. 
Compared to the approximately $2 billion in R&D carried out in Canada in 
1982, requests for advance income tax rulings as to eligibility of limited 
partnerships for R&D treatment only totalled $80 - 100 million. 3 Even if all the 
ventures had been successful, they would have accounted for only a very small 
percentage of R&D spending. There are no data available as to the amount of 
these $80 - 100 million that were actually issued. Rough estimates (provided by 
the Department of National Revenue) place the intended split between public 
and private offerings at 50/ 50 and computer software ventures at 50 per cent of 
the total. 
Large companies with financial resources to undertake R&D directly had 
little inclination to broaden their funding base by utilizing public limited 
partnerships due to their reluctance to give up ownership of the R&D. In 
addition, there is a strong preference for internal financing of R&D. 4 Also, solo 
corporate entities were entitled to all the deductions and credits, especially the 
50 per cent research allowance which was not available to corporate investors 
who were partners. This tax consideration, along with access to traditional 
equity and/ or debt markets made large firms unwilling to fund R&D through 
limited partnerships. 
172 	 Tax Incentives 
Notwithstanding the ultimate financial attractiveness of limited partnership 
funding to small established companies, the logistical problems and upfront 
financial costs of launching the vehicles constituted an almost insurmountable 
obstacle. Advance tax ruling, including the determination as to whether the 
activity qualified as R&D, took up to eight months. In the process National 
Revenue would consult with other government departments, primarily 
Industry, Trade and Commerce in the case of computer software, on the 
technical aspects of the limited partnership's business plan. The delay reflected 
the government's fundamental ambiguity about how widely the generous R&D 
tax incentives should be made available. On the one hand, government had 
released a booklet promoting R&D limited partnerships. On the other, there 
were concerns about the revenue cost of unconstrained tax incentives for R&D. 
These concerns were sparked by the emergence of Scientific Research 
Investment Contracts (S RICs) such as that offered by Northern Telecom which 
in effect passed R&D write-offs on to individual investors without requiring 
them to share in the risk of the venture. 
The application and waiting time for tax rulings were costly. In addition, the 
cost of prospectus and clearance through the relevant provincial securities  
commission(s) added significantly to the financial outlay. For example. one 
computer software tax shelter partnership estimated that to meet the required 
legal and regulatory requirements it had to spend some $200,000 before it was 
able to bring its issue to market. 
Accordingly, with large firms not interested in R&D limited partnerships and 
most small firms not willing to underwrite the initial costs, the field was left boa 
few venturesome companies which had much to gain (capital) and little to kw 
(ownership of the R&D). 
These entrepreneurially oriented, but largely undercapitalized entities.. szle 
the limited partnership route as the only way to raise money. Unfortu=Trk 
most were unable to clear all the hurdles and except for a few, those tha: 
were unable to obtain sufficient funds to launch their project(s). 
R&D limited partnerships are not likely to play a significant role 
financing of future R&D. Since the introduction of the Scientific Reseam-..L.TLI 
Credit in April 1983, there has been only one successful public offering 
possible that with the termination of the S RTC there may be a renewed ire 
in R&D limited partnerships but this has not been evident yet. 
The Scientific Research Tax Credit 
The most novel part of the R&D tax measures introduced in the Ar.-: 
budget was the Scientific Research Tax Credit. This mechanism 
government support for R&D by assisting firms that could not ILL!. 
advantage of their R&D tax benefits. This included start-up firms a frings 
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with unusually large commitments of R&D relative to income. The mechanism 
allowed such firms to sell the R&D write-offs which they could not use. It thus 
allowed firms to pre-fund their R&D programs. 
Under the mechanism investors financing R&D expenditures by research 
performing firms received a Scientific Research Tax Credit to offset against 
their tax otherwise payable. For a financing to qualify for such treatment the 
R&D performer had to agree not to take advantage of the R&D tax benefits 
itself. 
The take-up rate for the Scientific Research Tax Credit was much greater 
than expected. In the April 1983 budget paper on R&D tax policies it was 
estimated that the proposed R&D tax measures would add $100 million to the 
level of R&D tax support in 1984. Over the period that the SRTC was in effect 
its cost was originally estimated to be $225 million. The most recent publicly 
available estimate of the cost of the SRTC is $1.9 billion or $650 million 
annually for each of the three - years for which research has been funded under 
the program. 
There can be no doubt that the Scientific Research Tax Credit was highly 
successful in increasing the funds available for R&D. At least twelve of the top 
20 companies conducting R&D in Canada have made use of SRTCs. These 
include such major companies as Pratt & Whitney Canada Inc., Mitel, and 
Leigh Instruments. Nevertheless there were some fundamental problems with 
the program which lead to its ultimate termination in the May 23, 1985 budget. 
The biggest problem with the SRTC was that it turned out primarily to be a 
mechanism for selling tax credits in advance of performing R&D and not a 
means of financing R&D. The most common type of transaction accounting 
for the largest proportion of funds raised was what was called a "quick-flip." 
Under this type of transaction an R&D performer would issue a promissory 
note for $100,000 and redeem it the next day for $55,000. The corporation 
would pay a middleman $5,000 for arranging the deal and would keep $40,000. 
The investor would get $55,000 in cash plus a $50,000 tax credit for a risk-free 
net return of $5,000. 
The objection to the "quick-flip" from an economic point of view is that it 
was a very inefficient and costly way to deliver tax incentives. It used scarce 
resources of the brokerage industry for no other purpose than to provide tax 
relief. This constituted a perversion of the main function of the industry which is 
to serve as an intermediary in raising capital for investment. 
There were several other problems caused by "quick-flips" which should be 
noted. In many instances a "quick-flip" was a recipe for bankruptcy for firms in 
weak financial positions without sufficient past R&D to cover the "flip." Such 
firms were left with significantly less than half the proceeds of the "quick flip" 
and with an obligation to perform R&D covering the whole amount. 
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most small firms not willing to underwrite the initial costs, the field was left to a 
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Credit in April 1983, there has been only one successful public offering. Is is 
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budget was the Scientific Research Tax Credit. This mechanism increased 
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advantage of their R&D tax benefits. This included start-up firms and firms 
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The situation was worsened to the extent that investment dealers and other 
middlemen were involved in the transactions. Dealer commissions for "quick-
flips" were reported to have been in the 2 to 3 per cent range. Allan Lumsden, a 
chartered accountant with Coopers and Lybrand in Ottawa, was quoted in the 
Globe and Mail as estimating that the financial, legal and accounting costs of 
arranging an R&D tax credit deal amount to at least 2 per cent and probably 
close to 5 per cent of the value of the transaction. 5 The "quick-flip" has thus been 
a source of easy profits for investment dealers and others. New companies 
sprung up just to sell tax credits. "Double-flips" by means of which the credits 
were passed through another corporation entailed correspondingly higher 
commissions. Commissions reduced the amount of funds left over for carrying 
out the R&D commitment. 
The government established a number of safeguards to protect its own 
revenues in the case of non-fulfillment of R&D obligations. These included the 
designation of R&D expenditures by performing companies and the payment 
of Part VIII tax; directors' liability with respect to the payment of Part VIII tax, 
and the requirement that investors must show they had exercised due diligence 
in acquiring an S RTC. (Part VIII tax is the refundable tax, payable annually by 
a corporation and equal to the total SRTC designations it has made to 
investors. The tax is refundable when research expenditures are made or SRTC 
credits are earned.) 
It quickly became evident that some companies participating in "quick-flips" 
did not pay the Part VIII tax that they owed in the month following the 
transaction. Indeed, the Deputy Minister of National Revenue revealed to the 
Public Accounts Committee that of the Part VIII tax of $2.4 billion only $32 
million had been actually collected. 6 In certain cases, the government has had to 
force companies into bankruptcy in its effort to collect taxes. This was 
inevitable given the way the tax was structured to allow the sale of tax benefits 
in advance of being earned. This is an aspect of the SRTC that should be 
avoided in the future. 
Another possibility that must be acknowledged is that the "quick-flip" 
offered unscrupulous promoters an opportunity to make a fast buck at the 
expense of the federal treasury. It would have been a relatively easy matter to set 
up a shell company supposedly to do R&D, to engineer a "quick-flip" and to 
disappear with the money. In at least one instance this was reported to be the 
case. As long as investors could show that they exercised "due diligence" in 
acquiring the SRTC, they would have still benefitted from the SRTC. The 
potential for such a sham would have been avoided if the investors had had to 
actually invest their money in the company sponsoring the SRTC. Investors 
typically scrutinize investments more closely if their own money is at stake than 
if it is only the government's. 
Because of his concerns about the efficiency and effectiveness of "quick-flips" 
as an R&D financing vehicle as well as the skyrocketing cost of the program, 
Finance Minister, Michael Wilson, announced a moratorium on "quick-flips" 
on October 10, 1984. This moratorium allowed the new government time for a 
complete review of the "quick-flip" in consultation with interested groups. 
During the moratorium only common equity shares were entitled to the SRTC 
benefit. Such shares had to comply with the criteria governing shares qualifying 
for the share-purchase tax credit. Following the completion of the review, the 
Minister announced the termination of the SRTC in his May 23, 1985, budget 
effective immediately. 
The Current Tax Treatment of R&D 
The May 1985 budget built upon the April 1983 budget to establish the current 
framework for the tax treatment of R&D. The budget measures that provided 
additional specific support for R&D were: 
— 
the refundability of the 35 per cent tax credit for the first $2 million of R&D 
done by small firms; and 
— 
the modification of the definition of expenditures qualifying for R&D tax 
incentives to cover expenditures "all or substantially all" of which are 
attributable to R&D and to include current expenditures that are directly 
attributable to R&D. 
The budget measures that reduced the level of support were: 
— 
the termination of the flow-out of the scientific research tax credit effective 
immediately; and 
the elimination of the "stacking" of the investment tax credit and 
government grants (requiring the credit to be based on cost of eligible 
investments net of any government assistance or reimbursements which 
the taxpayer receives). 
The implications of these measures (except for the capital gains exemption 
and the changes in the definition of qualifying R&D) for the incentive to invest 
in R&D can be better appreciated by comparing the after-tax cost of $1 of 
expenditure on R&D for various classes of R&D performers after the May 
1985 budget with that before the April 1983 budget. The tax regime prior to the 
April 1983 budget was chosen as the standard of reference because it represents 
the tax system which was in effect before the recent major modifications to the 
tax treatment of R&D. The changes in the May 1985 budget represented a 
necessary adjustment to what- turned out to be an overly generous and 
unsustainable regime as a result of the much greater than anticipated take-up of 
the SRTC. 
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The main difference between the tax regime for R&D before and after the 
April 1983 budget (excluding the SRTC) was the replacement of a 10 
percentage point increase in the investment tax credit for the research allowance 
(an additional deduction equal to 50 per cent of the excess of expenditures on 
R&D over the average of the three previous years). 
Table 6 presents the comparison of the after-tax cost of $1 spent on R&D 
after the May 1985 budget with that before the April 1983 budget. Several 
observations can be made based on the table. 
Table 6 
Comparison of After Tax Cost of $1 of R&D After May 23, 1985 
Budget With That Before April 19, 1983 Budget 
BEFORE 
APRIL 19, 1983 
($) 
AFTER 
MAY 23, 1985 
($) 
Individuals 0.4500 0.4000 
Small Business Corporations 
— R&D not qualifying for 
research allowance 0.5625 0.4875 
— with 50 per cent IRAP grant 0.1875 0.2438 
— 35 per cent of R&D qualifying 
for research allowance 0.5189 
— 100 per cent of R&D qualifying 
for research allowance 0.4375 
Non-taxable corporations 1.0000 0.6500 
Other corporations 
— R&D not qualifying for 
research allowance 0.4500 0.4000 
— with 50 per cent 1RAP grant 0.2000 0.2000 
— 35 per cent of R&D qualifying 
for research allowance 0.3625 
— 100 per cent of R&D qualifying 
for research allowance 0.2000 
— Non-taxable corporations 1.0000 0.9600 
The R&D tax regime in effect after the May 1985 budget provided for a 
lower after-tax cost of R&D for individuals and corporations not taking 
advantage of the research allowance. Non-taxable small corporations have an 
especially lower after-tax cost because of the introduction of refundability of the 
investment tax credit on up to $2 million of R&D expenditures. For both small 
and large corporations, the investment tax credit is a much better way to 
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stimulate R&D than the research allowance so that even for corporations that 
were able to use the research allowance the incentive to undertake R&D may be 
greater after the May 1985 budget than prior to April 1983. 
The May 1985 budget also contained a discussion paper entitled The 
Corporate Income Tax System: A Direction for Change that proposed the 
substitution of a 7 percentage point reduction in the corporate income tax rate 
for the most rapid write-offs and the investment tax credit. This proposal has 
important implications for the incentive to invest in R&D since the tax credit 
for R&D would be retained. This would tend to promote investment in R&D 
by according it relatively more favourable tax treatment than other types of 
investment. On the other hand, such a major shift in the structure of taxation 
could have adverse effects on manufacturing which now benefits from 
preferential tax treatment and performs the bulk of R&D. This could be 
particularly troublesome if planned negotiations with the United States result in 
freer trade since it is manufacturing that will have to undertake the largest 
investments to restructure and adjust to a more competitive environment. 
Concerning the modification to the definition of qualifying R&D introduced 
in the May 1985 budget, the clarification of the regulations to read "scientific 
research and experimental development" is useful. If it works as intended by the 
Department of Finance, then the issue of the classification of expenditures as 
R&D will become an administrative matter. To facilitate administration the 
technical resources allocated to Revenue Canada have been increased. Also, the 
relaxation of the "wholly attributable" rule for the determination of qualifying 
R&D and the substitution of the provision that an expenditure "all or 
substantially all" of which is attributable to R&D responds to industry concerns 
and should be helpful. 
The Adequacy of R&D Tax Incentives 
Donald McFetridge and Jacek Warda have examined the adequacy and 
impact of tax incentives for R&D. 7 Their study was completed and published 
prior to the implementation of the new R&D tax incentives. Its main 
conclusion was that Canadian tax incentives for R&D were as generous as any 
in the world with the exception of Singapore. But it also conceded that R&D 
incentives of all countries including Canada could be inadequate. According to 
their estimates, the Canada R&D tax incentives are sufficient to offset an 
externality of something over 40 per cent (as measured by the excess of the 
social rate of return on R&D over the private sector rate of return). However, if 
the R&D externality is as high as the 77 per cent estimated in one study, 8 then 
the R&D incentives of Canada are not sufficient to offset the externality. 
McFetridge and Warda do not recommend enriching Canadian tax incentives 
for R&D. Instead, they expressed reservations about whether it is in Canada's 
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interest to provide for more generous tax treatment of R&D than other 
countries given that technology can be developed in one location and used 
without compensation in others. 
McFetridge and Warda presented estimates of the after-tax cost of R&D for 
Canada and other countries, and estimates of a measure called the "B-index" 
defined as: 
"the ratio of the present value of project-related before-tax income to the present 
value of project-related costs at which an R&D project becomes profitable for the 
firm that undertakes it. The B-index is thus the critical benefit-cost ratio. Projects 
with benefit-cost ratios higher than B are profitable for the firm as a whole and are 
undertaken; projects with benefit-cost ratios less than B are not profitable and are 
not undertaken." 9 
The advantage of the B-index is that it takes into account the impact of taxes 
in reducing after-tax returns as well as after-tax cost. 
Table 7 show the after-tax cost of $1 invested in R&D and the B-index for the 
1952 to 1984 period for a non-manufacturing firm benefitting from no special 
tax credits. It is noteworthy that the increase in the investment tax credit 
roughly compensates for the termination of the research allowance. At an 
assumed rate of inflation of 5 per cent and interest rate of 10 per cent, the 
after-tax cost and B-index are now slightly lower than before; at a rate of 
inflation of 10 per cent per year and interest rate of 15 per cent, they are a little 
higher. 10 
One important feature of the tax changes that is not reflected in the table is 
the extent to which the existing incentives were made more widely available 
through the S RTC in 1983 and 1984 and through the temporary refundability 
of the investment tax credit until May I, 1986. In the Department of Finance 
April 1983 budget paper on Research and Development Tax Policies it is noted 
that, prior to the recent changes, 70 per cent of R&D was done by firms who 
face some limit on their ability to use R&D tax incentives. 
Table 8 provides estimates comparing the after-tax cost and B-index by type 
of firm and location of the R&D in 1981 and in 1985. The R&D tax changes 
eliminate the differential in the B-index between manufacturing and non-
manufacturing firms that was mentioned as a source of slight bias against R&D 
in manufacturing by McFetridge and Warda. 11 The changes reinforce the bias 
in favour of small business noted by McFetridge and Warda. 12 This bias is 
further compounded by the refundability of the 35 per cent investment tax 
credit for the first $2 million of R&D by small firms introduced in the May 
1985 budget. 
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Table 7 
The After-Tax Cost of R&D and The B-Index for 1952 - 1984 
Assumptions 
	  After-Tax 
Corporate 	 I nterest 	 Cost 
Income Tax Inflation 	 Rate 	 Per Dollar 
Paiact 	 Per Cent 	 Per Cent 	 Per Cent 	 of R&D B-Index 
I) 1952-1960 
(excl. 1958) 50 5 10 .504 1.008 
2) 1958 47 5 10 .534 1.008 
3) 1961-1966 50 5 10 .475 .950 
4) 1967-1972 50 5 10 .424 .848 
5) 19-3 49 5 10 .434 .851 
6 19-3 49 10 15 .378 .741 
7) 19-4 48 5 10 .444 .854 
/0 1974 48 10 15 .387 .744 
9) 1975 47 5 10 .454 .856 
10) 1975 47 10 15 .397 .749 
I I ) 1976 46 5 10 .463 .857 
12) 1976 46 10 15 .407 .753 
13) 1978-1983 46 5 10 .449 .831 
14) 1978-1983 46 10 15 .414 .767 
15) 1983-1985 46 — — .432 .800 
Source: Table 3.2 from D.G. McFetridge and J.P. Warda, Canadian R&D Incentives: Their 
Adequacy and Impact, p. 36, for estimates covering 1952-1983. Estimates for 1983-84 are 
made following same methodology assuming 20 per cent investment tax credit. Under the 
new R&D tax regime the B-index is no longer dependent on the rate of inflation and the 
interest rate. Note that temporary changes in the corporate income tax are not taken into 
consideration. 
Another way to gauge the impact of tax incentives on R&D is to examine the 
evolution of industrial research and development expenditures in order to see if 
there is any obvious relationship between the generosity of tax incentives and 
the level of R&D spending. Table 9 displays the data on R&D spending in 
se% eral ways. These include the levels and rates of growth of R&D spending in 
both current and constant 1971 dollars as well as R&D spending as a 
proportion of GNP. 
The strong growth in both current and constant dollar R&D spending in 
1964 and 1965 following the introduction of an additional write-off equal to 50 
per cent of capital spending and 50 per cent of any increase in operating R&D 
expenses above their 1961 levels is noteworthy. The share of GNP devoted to 
R&D rose significantly during this period. A slowdown is evident in the growth 
of R&D spending, particularly in real terms, between 1967 and 1977 when this 
suite-off was replaced with the less generous Industrial Research and 
Development Incentives Act which allowed a grant or credit of 25 per cent of 
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Table 8 
The After-Tax Cost of R&D and The B-Index by 
Characteristics of Firm and R&D, 1981 compared to 1985 
Firms & R&D Characteristics 
1) Large, non-Atlantic region non-
manufacturing, domestic R&D 
2) Large, Atlantic region, non-
manufacturing, domestic R&D 
3) Small, non-manufacturing, 
any region, domestic R&D 
4) Small, manufacturing, 
any region, domestic R&D 
5) Large, manufacturing, non-Atlantic 
region, domestic R&D 
6) Large manufacturing, non-Atlantic 
region, foreign R&D 
After-Tax Cost B-Index 
1981 1985 1981 1985 
.414 .432 .767 .800 
.360 .378 .667 .700 
.519 .488 .692 .650 
.565 .520 .706 .650 
.476 .480 .793 .800 
.614 .614 1.023 1.023 
Source: Table 3.3 from D.G. McFetridge and J.P. Warda, Canadian R&D Incentives: They 
Adequacy and Impact, p. 83 for estimates for 1981. An inflation rate of 10 per cent and an 
interest rate of 15 per cent are assumed in the calculations for 1981. The estimates for 1985 
are based on the same methodology. The provincial corporate tax rate is assumed to be 10 
per cent. Temporary corporate surtaxes are ignored. 
capital spending, but limited the grant or credit for current R&D expenses to 25 
per cent of the average of expenditures in the previous five years. During this 
period the GNP share of R&D drifted downwards. In April 1977 an investment 
tax credit equal to 5 to 10 per cent of eligible investment was introduced. It was 
increased from 10 to 25 per cent of eligible expenditures after November 17. 1978_ 
In 1978, following the introduction of the investment tax credit, the growth of 
R&D spending picked up strongly only slowing as the worst post-war recession 
took hold in 1981-82. This paralleled but lasted longer than a concurrent boom 
in capital spending. It raised the share of GNP dedicated to industrial R&D to a 
high of 0.7 per cent. The share declined only marginally after 1982. Given the 
large decline experienced by business investment over the period, this could be 
interpreted as evidence that the R&D tax incentives introduced in April 1983 
did provide significant support for investment in what would otherwise have 
been a very difficult period for R&D. It is important to recall that the cost of tax 
incentives for R&D averaged about $1 billion annually over the 1983 to 1985 
period. This represented over one-third of R&D spending. It is difficult to see 
how the recent relatively high level of R&D spending can be maintained no 
that the SRTC has been eliminated. 
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Table 9 
Industrial Research and Development Spending 
Year 
Current dollars 
(mil. $) (% change) 
Const. 1971 dollars 
(mil. $) (% change) (% of GNP) 
1963 176 235 0.38 
1964 229 30.1 299 27.1 0.46 
1965 286 24.9 362 20.9 0.52 
1966 313 9.4 379 4.8 0.51 
1967 333 6.4 388 2.3 0.50 
1968 339 1.8 382 -1.4 0.47 
1969 369 8.8 399 4.4 0.46 
1970 420 13.8 433 8.7 0.49 
1971 430 2.4 430 -0.8 0.46 
1972 462 7.4 440 2.3 0.44 
1973* 503 8.9 439 -0.2 0.41 
1974 613 21.9 464 5.7 0.42 
1975 700 14.2 478 3.1 0.42 
1976 755 7.9 471 -1.6 0.39 
1977 857 13.5 497 5.7 0.41 
1978 1006 17.4 547 10.0 0.43 
1979 1266 25.8 625 14.1 0.48 
1980 1570 24.0 695 11.3 0.53 
1981 2126 35.4 851 22.5 0.63 
1982 2494 17.3 905 6.3 0.70 
1983 2518 1.0 868 -4.1 0.65 
1984p 2794 11.0 937 7.9 0.66 
I985p 3044 8.9 990 5.7 0.67 
Note: The data for 1984 and 1985 represents intentions as the survey was done in April 1984. 
Source: Statistics Canada, Industrial Research and Development Statistics (1983). Minister of 
Supply and Services Canada (1985). 
Conclusions 
There are two general conclusions that can be drawn from a review of the 
Canadian experience with tax incentives for R&D. First, there is general 
agreement that these incentives are relatively generous. This was the view of 
both the Wright Task Force and the Senate Committee that recently examined 
the situation.I 3 Second, there is also some evidence from an examination of 
trends in R&D spending in relation to changes in R&D tax incentives that these 
incentives have had a positive impact on the level of R&D spending. 
There are also several observations on the specifics of R&D tax policy that 
can usefully be made. The current tax regime for R&D has clearly been in a 
state of flux in recent years. The April 1983, budget laid the foundation for a 
new tax regime for R&D. However, the Scientific Research Tax Credit which 
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allowed tax write-offs and credits to be flowed out to investors in the form of a 
50 per cent tax credit turned out to be both too expensive and subject to abuse. 
It was for these reasons that the SRTC was scrapped in May 1985. 
The termination of the SRTC left the government with the problem of how 
to provide support for those R&D performers that are unable to benefit fully 
from the relatively generous write-offs and the investment tax credit because 
they faced some limit on their ability to use R&D tax incentives. Overall 70 per 
cent of R&D is done by such firms. The government's proposed solution was to 
allow refundability for the first $2 million of R&D done by small firms 
qualifying for the 35 per cent investment tax credit. This takes care of the 
problem for small firms, but leaves the problem for the large firms that 
undertake most R&D. This problem is likely to become more acute after the 
expiry in May, 1986, of the temporary measures which allow for the partial 
refundability of the investment tax credit. If R&D tax incentives are to be 
delivered more effectively and R&D spending is to be maintained at its recent 
relatively high level, this issue will have to be addressed. Some form of 
continuing refundability within the current framework is the most promising 
policy option_ 
A very positive feature of the recent changes in R&D tax policy is the 
replacement of the research allowance by a 10-percentage-point increase in the 
investment tax credit. For both small and large corporations, the investment 
tax credit is a much better way to stimulate R&D than the research allowance 
so that even for corporations that were able to use the research allowance the 
incentive to undertake R&D may be greater after the May 1985 budget than 
prior to April 1983. 
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